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CHINESE EXPANSION HISTORICALLY REVIEWED

BY

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PART I

GENERAL SURVEY

SIR THOMAS HOLDICH: All eyes are turned towards the Far East, watching the results of what is really a contest between Asiatic peoples, due to a process of expansion which is natural to all great nations. We shall listen, I am sure, with great interest to the historic retrospect of the expansion of China which Baron Suyematsu, with the advantage of his special knowledge on the subject, is to put before us. With characteristic modesty as to his power of reading English, the Baron has asked his friend Mr. Chirol to read the paper for him.

BARON SUYEMATSU: I feel it not only a great honour but a great pleasure to lay before you some of my views on the subject of China. A great deal of what I may have to say may be trite to many, but I shall be very pleased if you will give me your attention. I have divided my paper into three parts: (1) A general historic retrospect of China; (2) the Khorean Peninsula and Manchuria; (3) reflections and arguments.

The paper is a trifle too long, and some parts may be omitted in reading if the time is not sufficient. I am not a good reader of English. If I gave the paper myself I am afraid a good deal of it would not be intelligible to the audience. My friend Mr. Chirol has kindly consented to read the paper for me.

LOOKING at a map of the world, one will at once see how vast is the Chinese Empire. There was a time when it was even more vast than at present. The expansion of China is an important subject of history, but its limit was

* Pressure of space has unfortunately rendered necessary the omission of two or three passages in this paper dealing more exhaustively with the causes which restricted Chinese expansion towards India and in Tibet.

reached long ago. How that expansion was brought about and how that limit was reached is a matter which it might interest many of us to know.

I will not go back to the remotest periods, or seek to make any ethnological investigations as to the races that originally occupied the regions which have come under the sovereignty of China, or which, at least, have been included in the sphere of her influence; for were we to do so, we might find there was a time when both Mongolians and Chinese belonged to the same race; or, if we were to go further back still, it might appear that both these and many other peoples living quite outside Chinese influence originally belonged to the same stock. But these connections are too remote and obscure, and have no important bearing on the proposition I am about to make. It is sufficient for my purpose to trace the growth of the Chinese Empire within the limits of the records which we possess—chiefly in the literature of China itself—and that, too, of a very appreciable antiquity.

It is a well-known fact that China is one of the most ancient countries of the world. The Chow dynasty ruled in the period when we begin to find reliable records, and the beginning of that dynasty dates back twelve centuries B.C. The period preceding that dynasty had been a very long one, but of it we have no reliable records. It is mainly regarded as the legendary state of Chinese history; and yet there are some records relating to twenty-three centuries B.C. There is good foundation, moreover, for believing those documents to be genuine records, from the mathematical calculations made by many experts in such matters, relating to astronomical events recorded in those documents, and which all go to confirm their accuracy.

In studying the old documents and history of China, the heart of China in the earliest period is seen to have been located somewhere far up the river Hoang-ho. Those who have studied the evolution of the alphabet tell us that the Hoang-ho is one of three remarkable rivers on the banks of which the three original systems of recording impressions were invented—the Egyptian writing on the Nile, the Cunei-

form beside the streams of Mesopotamia, and the Chinese on the Hoang-ho—and that the hundreds of existing systems of writing now in use are really derivatives of these three, however varied and modified they may be.

The area of the original centre of China was very limited, but its sphere of influence and activity gradually spread, generation after generation, as its civilization developed and extended to the surrounding regions. This extension was carried on with but little intermission through successive centuries, until at last a vast Empire, more or less compact, had arisen from the agglomeration. The one peculiarity of this extension is that, roughly speaking, it has not been the result of aggressive conquest. China has always been on the defensive, and it is the surrounding peoples who have always assumed the offensive against her. The conquests China has made have in reality been the effect of the influence of her civilization. Neighbouring peoples came and attacked China, but they soon were amalgamated with the Chinese through the influence of the latter's civilization, and then became sinicized. There was always a marked difference of degree between the civilization of the inhabitants of the centre of China and that of her neighbours, so that the moment the latter came in contact with the Chinese they discovered their inferiority, and whatever sort of primitive civilization they might have had amongst themselves was soon eclipsed by the higher Chinese civilization, and they became Chinese.

The fact that China has no proper and permanent name for herself, except the names of the successive dynasties, goes a long way to explain this state of things. Such terms as the 'Central Flowery Land,' or the 'Middle Land,' are no more than mere fanciful appellations, and the very term China is only a name by which she came to be called by outsiders. There is some resemblance between the romanization of Europe and the sinicization of Eastern Asia, but the nature of the process, as well as the ultimate results achieved, was very different.

We know that in Tibet letters were only imported early in the seventh century A.D. In Mongolia letters were intro-

duced only in the middle of the thirteenth century A.D., and in Manchuria several centuries afterwards. All this marks the great difference that existed in the degree of civilization between these peoples and the Chinese, who a long, long time before had possessed a very advanced literature of their own. Roughly speaking, the modern China Proper is that part of the Empire which is bounded by the Great Wall in the north, and excludes Central Asia and Tibet on the west and Cochin China on the south. But for many centuries in the Chinese history this so-called China Proper was not one compact nation, because even in the time of the Chow dynasty neither the part which surrounds Peking on the north, nor the regions around Kansu, nor, above all, the regions which are situated south of the Yang-tse River, nor even some zones on the left bank of that river, were strictly regarded as China Proper. They were then included in the general category of the 'land of the barbarians.' All the characters in Chinese representing them in generic form are to be translated as 'barbarians,' and the Chinese themselves also understood them in that sense from very early, if not actually from the earliest, times.

Originally those characters had probably a less pronounced meaning. Perhaps they meant people outside their own civilization, or perhaps some of the characters only represented the names of the tribes. Even if this was so, the fact that the people living in those regions were not to be regarded as belonging to the same community as the Chinese is most plain from ancient records. Nevertheless, in those surrounding regions there arose several compact communities, which afterwards became kingdoms, though no recognition of their status as kingdoms was ever made by China. For instance, toward the latter part of the Chow dynasty there arose on the banks of the Yang-tse a large community called 'Chu.' It was to all intents and purposes a kingdom, and, as a matter of fact, the chief of that community was called a King among his own people, though the word 'King' did not necessarily mean an independent Sovereign of an

independent State. But that chief was only styled a Baron by the Court of Chow, 'Baron' being the lowest of five classes of titles by which the heads of different principalities were privileged to be called.

The Chow dynasty arose, according to the ordinary chronicles, in the latter part of the twelfth century B.C., and came to an end in the middle of the third century B.C. Under the Chow dynasty many principalities came into existence, both within and without what was then the heart of China. The authority of the Central Government appears not to have been thoroughly exercised; but from the fact that such principalities existed, the political system of the Empire may be called a feudal system, though the system cannot be said to have been identical with that which existed in Europe.

There are many documentary records to show that the Chow dynasty had much trouble in its earlier years from barbarians on its western borders, localities which are situated within the boundaries of modern China Proper. The dynasty was exterminated by these barbarians in the earlier part of the eighth century B.C., the last Emperor of its line having been murdered by them. The Eastern Chow succeeded, but the Imperial authority was significantly on the wane. The whole period of the Eastern Chow dynasty is otherwise divided into two, the earlier part being called the 'Spring and Autumn Period,' because that period corresponds roughly with the period which is covered by the chronicle of the 'Spring and Autumn' (Chun-chu), edited by Confucius; and the latter part is called the 'Fighting States Period' (Chan-kue), because it was a time when China was split up between different States, and fighting was continually going on between them.

From the point of view of intellectual cultivation, the latter part of the 'Spring and Autumn Period' and the 'Fighting States Period' are the most brilliant epochs of Chinese history, because, as we see, in those days all sorts of mental activity were manifested in China. Not only from the scholastic and philosophical point of view, but

also from a military point of view, that period gave to China guiding principles for the benefit of all posterity. During the fighting period the various minor principalities became swallowed up by the mightier ones, until at last China was unified under Chin. The Eastern Chow, which had had an existence only in name for centuries, had been totally extinguished some thirty years before. It is to be noticed that Chin and Chu themselves had been regarded in former times as barbarians, but their power obtained supreme recognition during the 'Spring and Autumn Period,' as well as in the 'Fighting States Period.'

Roughly speaking, the unification of the Empire under the Chin dynasty comprised the modern China Proper. The Chin dynasty was a powerful one, and its founder was one of the strongest rulers of China. It is even presumed that the name 'China,' which has come to denote the Empire of China, was first derived from the name of this dynasty. Its founder abolished the feudal system, and divided the Empire into districts, which were governed by State Deputies, and not by hereditary Princes. Yet, strong as this dynasty was, it was gravely harassed by the invasions of the barbarians from the north. It was then that the great General Mung-tien was despatched with 300,000 men to fight the northern barbarians, and constructed defensive works to repel their advance, which resulted in that great wonder of the world, the Great Wall of China. Even that powerful dynasty never thought of extending its dominions towards the north; its only object was to prevent outsiders from coming south. The Chin dynasty, which its founder hoped to maintain for many generations—inasmuch as he called himself Chin-huang-ti, meaning the first Emperor, and decreed that all his successors should be known by their cardinal numbers in due rotation—came to an end soon after his death: and one of the chief causes of this was the exhaustion of the power of the Empire and the discontent of the people at large on account of the tremendous sacrifices and labour involved in the building of the famous Great Wall.

Under the Han dynasty that followed—i.e., from the

end of the third century B.C. until the third century A.D.—the history of China, though containing some brilliant records of internal development, is mainly the story of continual struggles against the northern barbarians—great expeditions and often great reverses and humiliations. We read of a great Emperor himself being besieged by them, and only escaping from being made a prisoner by enormous bribery. Whole armies suffered defeat, and, with their Generals, were taken prisoners. Imperial messengers were kept in detention, and there is a sad story of a Court lady, described as a Princess, being surrendered in marriage to a barbarian chieftain. Giving treasure in the shape of bribes, or handing over a Princess in marriage, was one of the methods of pacifying the barbarians which grew very common in all the later periods.

The northern barbarians whom I have described above were chiefly those called 'Hung-nu' by the Chinese and 'Huns' by Western writers. Their detailed history is not known, but we may presume that they were not much advanced in civilization, though, compared with the modern natives living in the same locality, they had more courage, more organization, and somewhat more cohesive forces. They did not necessarily belong to one community. Sometimes there were many tribes coexisting, and sometimes one of them absorbed all, or nearly all, the others. We also find it recorded that they presently became, after having once amalgamated, divided into two sections, called the South and the North Huns. From about the middle of the Han dynasty, they appear to have turned their chief activity towards the west, and gradually to have made their way, some to India and some to lands still further westward. From the fact that the Great Wall extended from Liautung Bay far away towards Central Asia, it seems certain that the Huns of those days occupied a very wide space of territory north and west of China.

After having passed through the troubled period of the so-called Three States Epoch, China was once more unified under the Chin dynasty, but a large zone within the Great Wall passed into the hands of the northern intruders in its earlier years. This was followed by the rising of several new States, one after another, in the north and north-western parts of China, most of them being of barbarian origin. Chin at last fell under their pressure, and was followed by the period known as the 'Period of the South and North Dynasties,' the latter, which were mostly of barbarian origin, being preponderant.

The North and South dynasties were unified under the Sui dynasty towards the end of the sixth century A.D. is about this time that the barbarians known as the Tuku-Hun (a tribe in Kokonor) seem to have begun giving trouble to China, for we find a Princess was given in marriage by the Sui Emperor to their chief, and later on during the same dynasty several raids are recorded to have been made by them. They seem to have occupied the borderland of modern Tibet; some think they were the same, or part of the same, people who were known a little later by the name of Tufan, who were no other than the There was trouble also with the modern Tibetans. northern barbarians, called Tu-Chueh (Turks), as well as with Korea, with which country I shall deal separately. The Sui dynasty was followed by the Tang dynasty in the beginning of the seventh century. T'ang was one of the most brilliant dynasties of China, especially as regards the earlier part of it, the second Emperor being truly a great monarch. Under him China shone with a great lustre, and vet even this dynasty was not free from much serious trouble at the hands of the barbarians. On the north the same Tu-Chuch made several raids during the reign of the first Emperor, and they were repeated in the reign of the second Emperor. It was only by the strenuous efforts of the second Emperor that victory was in some measure achieved. At first a temporary peace was bought by the humiliating method of giving a Princess in marriage to the chief of the barbarians, as well as much treasure. On the west also the Tufans gave much trouble; so did also the Wuigur, a neighbouring tribe of the Tufans. The locality of the Tufans' habitation in those days was in the main the same as modern Tibet; perhaps it may have extended somewhat more towards the Chinese boundary. Great Sovereign as the second Emperor undoubtedly was, and brilliant and prosperous as China had at that time become under the new dynasty, even he at last thought it best to make peace with the invaders. The Tibet of those days was ruled as a kingdom, the name of its Chief or King being Sron-btsan-sgampo. He seems to have been a shrewd and able man. To him the Emperor gave a Princess to wed, and in allying him to his house concluded a peace.

The Tang dynasty, as we have seen, had much trouble in the west, but it had still more on the north-west and north. The barbarians thence made repeated and sanguinary raids. The earlier of these hordes were designated the Tu-Chueh, but the later ones were known by the name of Kittan. Both of them were probably offshoots of the Huns. It seems that the Tu-Chueh grew in strength as the earlier Huns migrated westwards, and then the Kittan appear in turn to have eclipsed them. We see it recorded during this time that well-known Chinese Generals were despatched to fight these barbarians, and also that a statesman of high repute was despatched as Imperial Ambassador to make peace, only to be detained and murdered.

After the Tang dynasty came the Period of the Five Dynasties, during the first part of the tenth century. Three out of these five dynasties were of barbarian origin, they having been founded by men who sprang from some regions outside the Great Wall, though they seem to have been already much sinicized. It was at this time that Kittan. which had arisen in Manchuria, rapidly grew into a mighty power. As a matter of fact, Cathay, by which the Westerners of the Middle Ages called China, or Kitaiski, by which the Russians do the same, seems to have been no other than a corruption of Kittan. Its Chief adopted the title of Emperor, and called the dynasty the Great Liau, the Liau being the same as the Chinese character for Liau in Liautung. It rose in power rapidly, and before the Period of the Five Dynasties came to an end it had expanded right up to the Great Wall, and, moreover, a large portion within

the Great Wall had been ceded to it by one of the Five Dynasties. The last of the Five Dynasties was succeeded by the Sung dynasty, which commenced a little after the middle of the tenth century and ended in the early part of the twelfth century, A.D.

During the Sung dynasty the Kittan—i.e., Liau—grew stronger, and became a source of constant uneasiness and danger to China. The dominion of Liau extended from the north to well inside the Great Wall, comprising the regions belonging to modern Pechihli, or even more. It was to all intents and purposes a well-organized empire. It lasted over one hundred years, having had ten Emperors in succession. Side by side with it there arose another mighty power, called the Kin, from the shores of the Japan sea. It fought against the Liau, and it at last destroyed the latter in the earlier part of the twelfth century, and having made itself master of the territories occupied by the Liau, it then fought against China. In a short time it overran the northern part of China; the last two Emperors of Sung were taken prisoners in quick succession, and both were carried into the interior of Manchuria, and kept in custody in a castle called Wukuocheng, where they ultimately died. Thus the Sung dynasty came to an end.

Yet another empire, with the name of Hia, had arisen in the region adjoining the western part of the Great Wall, also giving much trouble to the Sung dynasty, whilst the Cochins raided in the south. On the fall of the Sung dynasty, the Southern Sung dynasty established itself in the South of China. But Kin had become a great Chinese power. It was no longer a northern barbarian State. In many senses it may be said to have become a real Chinese dynasty. But even while Kin was contesting in China Proper with the Southern Sung dynasty, there arose behind Kin yet another power in the north from the banks of the Onon, in the modern Transbaikal province of Russia, which was no other than the mighty Mongolian Empire, under the leadership of the great Genghiskhan. Thus the Kin had an enemy both in the front and in the rear—the decaying

but still active Chinese dynasty in its front, and the Mongolians at its back. Kin was finally destroyed by the Mongolians in 1234, having lasted 180 years, with ten Emperors in succession. It now became a struggle between the Mongolians and the Southern Sung dynasty. Towards the latter part of the thirteenth century the Southern Sung dynasty was finally destroyed by the Mongolians, who at last came to govern the whole of China under Kublaikhan, grandson of Genshiskhan, and the dynasty was named Yuen.

The Yuen dynasty lasted until a little after the middle of the fourteenth century. Whilst their relatives and old compatriots were still doing great things in other directions, the Mongolians, who had established the Yuen dynasty in China, adapted themselves to the ways of China, and adopted all Chinese institutions as their own, except that they introduced the Lamaism of Tibet, not only into Mongolia, but also into China, which did more harm than good to the Imperial cause. Powerful as the dynasty was at first, it failed to become a firmly consolidated Empire, and in the earlier part of the fourteenth century much discontent manifested itself among the people, and the Empire fell again upon evil days, until at last its place was taken by the Ming dynasty, a little before the middle of the fourteenth century. The Ming dynasty reigned in China until the middle of the seventeenth century, after which the prestige of that dynasty was only maintained by Kokusenya (Coxinga), a loyal subject of the Ming dynasty, and half Japanese, who established a kingdom on his own account in Formosa, though still paying allegiance to the memory of the last dynasty, and setting the new Tartar dynasty for some time at defiance. The Ming dynasty was a weak one, and it suffered all along the eastern coasts from a succession of so-called Japanese attacks, though they were in no sense authorized Japanese forces that rayaged the Chinese shores; but they were very powerful, and it seems that even many Chinese subjects joined them. The blow inflicted on the Ming dynasty was a very heavy one; so also

was the invasion of Korea by the Japanese troops of Hideyoshi, as the Mings cast in their lot with Korea. Above all, there arose the Tartar dynasty of Manchuria. This Tartar dynasty originated somewhere in Manchuria at a place called Odoli, and grew in power in the same fashion as the Liau and Kin had done. Having made repeated attacks on China, it at last destroyed the Ming dynasty, and subjugated the whole of China under its yoke; it is the present ruling dynasty of China, and the name of this dynasty is Tsing.

I may here mention that the Liau made Peking its chief capital, and so did the Kin. The Ming dynasty, which was a proper Chinese dynasty hailing from the south, also kept its Court mostly at Peking, though Nanking was also its capital. The present dynasty also, as everyone knows, removed its capital from Manchuria to Peking, and thus Peking, which is situated in a region which in ancient times was only a barbarian country, has become the great centre of China, and one of the largest capitals of the world; and I need not say that the present dynasty has entirely adopted the Chinese notions of civilization and all Chinese institutions, though some precautions are taken to maintain Manchurian influence in every public department. This was only natural, because the degree of Tartar civilization seems to have been very low, and one thing is certain—namely, that through amalgamation with China, the Tartar nation has almost lost its distinctive existence.

On the western side, towards Central Asia and Tibet, Chinese influence was gradually extended, especially under the Mongolian dynasty, and later on under the Tartar dynasty. On the south, Tonking, Annam, Siam, and Burmah, also came to be influenced by China, more especially under both the Mongolian and the Tartar dynasties. But in all these places China's influence has been of a loose nature, and not permanent or preponderant. The limit of her expansion was reached long ago, and for some time past it has been decidedly and rapidly waning, as I shall hereafter show.

PART II

KOREAN PENINSULA AND MANCHURIA

I would now invite your attention to the Korean Peninsula and the Liautung Peninsula and Manchuria, as well as to Siberia. Amongst these regions the Korean Peninsula seems to have at one time attained in its civilization a degree far superior to other regions in the northern as well as western and southern boundaries of China.

The Korean Peninsula formed for centuries a compact kingdom, having a well-defined boundary on the north, in the same shape as it has now, but one must not think that it has always been so. The first mention made in Chinese history of that peninsula is at the beginning of the Chow dynasty—i.e., the eleventh century B.C., when it was known by the name of Chowsen. The first Emperor of that dynasty is reported to have sent Kitsu, a wise man and an uncle of the last Emperor of the preceding dynasty, to that region, and empowered him to rule it as King. His descendants continued to exercise the same prerogatives down to the beginning of the second century B.C., when the Ki family is reported to have been put an end to, and another Chowsen kingdom was established.

It is impossible to define the exact area of the region which was comprised within the compass of Chowsen, either in its earlier stage or in the later one, but the most trustworthy views are that it extended on the north far into the interior towards the Liau River, or that it was gradually extended so far, and that at one time it included the modern Yingkow. And this seems the more likely to be true, inasmuch as the heads of Kau-ku-li some time later received from China on one or two occasions the title of Prince of Liautung. But on the south it does not appear to have reached much beyond the Tatung River, on which

the modern Pingyang is situated. According to the Korean account, Kitsu established his capital at Pingyang. Koreans credit Kitsu with having initiated everything in the direction of civilization, and revere him accordingly. His tomb is to be seen in Pingyang, and it is still reverently preserved by the Koreans. That tomb, however, is said to have been discovered after much research by the founder of a later Korean dynasty—namely, Kau-li—at the beginning of the twelfth century A.D. We cannot, therefore, state how far the early history is exact, but there is no ground to doubt its general accuracy. The second Chowsen kingdom was destroyed by China at the end of the second century B.C., in the reign of the fifth and very able Emperor of the Han dynasty. In the meantime, in the southern part of the peninsula several kingdoms came into existence. In the north, where was situated the former Chowsen kingdom, another kingdom sprang into prominence, named Kau-ku-li. There were many vicissitudes among the southern kingdoms, but they were generally three in number.

With all these kingdoms, more especially the southern ones, Japan had much connection in the early centuries A.D., and the intercourse became much more extended and its effects multiplied in the sixth and seventh centuries. would be idle for me here to recite the whole history of our relationship with these kingdoms, but I may sum it up by saying that Japan's historical interest in Korea is of very ancient date. At one time intruders from the Korean Peninsula infested Kiushiu, and the Japanese counter-attack on the peninsula was carried out in order to repress them at their bases, and to secure permanent peace. Again, at one time Japan derived her civilization from China chiefly through Korea, as the Japanese went there and their people came to Japan for purposes of study and the acquisition of There was even a period when one or other of these kingdoms was directly under Japanese rule, Japan having her Government establishments there.

At the beginning of the seventh century A.D. some complications arose between the Sui dynasty of China and

Kau-ku-li, and the former sent expeditions against the latter, the Chinese Emperor once commanding in person, but the expedition proved an entire failure.

Toward the latter part of the reign of the great second Emperor of the T'ang dynasty of China another expedition against Kau-ku-li was undertaken by China, the origin of which is reported to have been that one of the southern kingdoms was menaced by Kau-ku-li and asked China's help. That expedition also did not prove successful, but in the reign of the next Emperor Kau-ku-li was destroyed by the combined effort of China and one of the southern kingdoms above mentioned. Kau-ku-li changed its capital several times, but Ping-yang and Kiu-lien-cheng were in their turn the two principal seats of government.

In the beginning of the tenth century A.D. another kingdom, called Kau-li, arose on the old ruins of Kau-ku-li. This is the origin of the name Korea, by which the peninsular kingdom came to be known to the Westerners. The Chinese characters which represent Kau-li and the Kau and li of Kau-ku-li are identical; hence they are often confused even in Oriental books, but the terms are quite distinct from one another, although Kau-li might possibly have been taken in the first place from Kau-ku-li. The whole Korean Peninsula was unified by Kau-li in the earlier part of the tenth century A.D.

The kingdom of Kau-li came to an end towards the end of the fourteenth century, and was replaced by another which revived in itself the ancient name of Chowsen. This latter is the present reigning family of Korea. It seems the region north of the Yalu was lost to Korea in the later days of Kau-ku-li, when that kingdom came to an end, and its territory was divided between Shinlo and China. Korea has never regained it; on the contrary, she always had on the north to struggle from time to time with powerful opponents who arose in the regions of Manchuria, and to whom in the end she had necessarily to submit.

As to the general relationship between China Proper and the Korean Peninsula, it seems that the latter had

usually a leaning towards the former, excepting in regard to her close connection with Japan. It was only natural that this should be so, because Korea's civilization was also derived from China, and that, too, as I said before, in even a greater degree than other regions that were close to China; hence they felt a natural deference to China.

Nevertheless, Korea had occasional troubles with China, and this was especially the case with its northern part i.e., the kingdom of Kau-ku-li. These troubles, however, cannot be attributed to any aggressive ambition of the Chinese, for their causes and circumstances as a rule proved the exact opposite. At the worst, the decision of China in each case was arrived at more for the sake of restoring her damaged prestige than with any idea of accomplishing territorial expansion.

As to the regions further to the north—that is to say, modern Manchuria and the maritime provinces of Siberia—we do not know much about them; but, as I have shown already, the Huns seem to have been living there in the Chin and Han dynasties, and were even then a very strong combination. But the exact boundaries which they had under their sway are not known, except that their dominion seems to have extended from Manchuria far to the west. The parts of the region surrounding Yingkow and Liauyang from time to time belonged to China, but no permanent hold was maintained.

In the north (in the regions of the modern maritime provinces and Harbin) there were two great hordes of Machieh. The southern one of these is said to have gradually extended far into Southern Manchuria. In the beginning of the eighth century we see there was a principality called Pohai; that principality is said to have been identical with the Southern Machieh. The name is very often mentioned in Japanese history, Japan having now and then had some dealings with it. The modern Liautung Bay is sometimes called Pohai Bay, and this would imply that the principality had extended to the coast of that bay. It seems to have formed a regular State, but

it also, after the lapse of some centuries, disappeared into oblivion.

There was another State, which was sometimes known as Shushen, sometimes Nuchen, and sometimes Nuchih. was probably situated in or near the part of Siberia which is called the Maritime Province. This State afterwards actually developed into the Kin dynasty of China. We see in history several other names having some connection with these regions—that is to say, modern Manchuria and the Maritime Province of Siberia—but it is almost impossible to make any accurate statements about them. appears that in many cases one and the same region belonged in succession to different tribal associations, some of which gradually became very powerful forces, as we have already seen in such cases as those of Liau and Kin. We must also note that not only did the inhabitants of these regions come into close contact with the Chinese, but they also had much fighting amongst themselves, as well as against some of the powers which properly belonged to the Korean Peninsula.

On the whole, however, I can safely say that China has never had any secure hold of Korea, even in recent centuries. True it is that China claimed a sort of suzerainty over Korea, but on the part of Korea there was as much respect and deference paid by her to her eastern neighbour as was paid to China, and in a manner that was almost identical. Then, what has taken place within the last few decades is known to everyone. Even in the case of Manchuria, apart from dynastic reasons, it is one of the weakest parts of the Chinese Empire, as I shall presently be able to demonstrate, so that in this direction also the potentiality of China's expansion long ago reached its uttermost limit.

PART III

CONCLUSION

I have now given the essential points of Chinese expansion. What I have said will, I hope, be sufficient to give a fair idea of the subject under our consideration. We have seen that the rough outline of modern China Proper was formed very early. Within these limits there are, of course, some differences of degree in the way of civilization. Progress was slower on the west and south-western sides than elsewhere; in fact, on the south-western side traces of the earlier barbarian tribes are very clearly recognisable even to this day.

But, roughly speaking, China Proper has become a huge nation. It is true that, owing to the fact that the distance from one end of the country to the other is so vast, the inhabitants do not orally understand each other (except those who speak the Mandarin tongue); but their written language is the same, and their thoughts, ideas, customs, and manners have all become almost identical. It must not, however, be imagined that this was so from the beginning, because, as I have shown already, the ancient China Proper was but a very small portion of the modern China Proper. It has grown to its present dimensions chiefly by the influence of its civilization. again, outside China Proper we have already seen that on the south the Malay Peninsula came to share to some extent the Chinese influence; and this was the case also on the west as far as Tibet (the region bordering Tibet having actually come under the Chinese rule), as well as throughout the greater part of Central Asia. Of course, these regions in turn have given trouble to China, but they ultimately had to bow their heads to China's superior civilization. But it was the north that at all times gave China the greatest anxiety—a region whence the disturbing elements of Eastern Asia have always sprung up. That there is the Great Wall on the northern side, whilst there is no such thing on the south or west, is a fact more eloquent than words. China would have been more than satisfied to make that Great Wall the outermost limit of her northern dominions, but the peoples outside of it were of another mind.

We all know that the large domains of Mongolia and Manchuria in these days form part of the Chinese Empire. Considerable parts of Siberia also at one time belonged to her, until she was deprived of them at quite a recent date by her great northern neighbour. These regions, however, were added to China, oddly enough, by those very people who, having resolved to war with their peaceable neighbour, set out on an errand of conquest. that errand they succeeded, but the conquerors did not convert the country they conquered to their own ideas, minds, customs, manners, or institutions; on the contrary, they were themselves converted by the conquered country, and, having imbibed Chinese ideas, it was they who extended the influence of the conquered country into their own original homes. The very fact that, whenever a barbarian State acquired some power in China, it adopted a Chinese name for its dynasty even before it subdued China explains much. There is a notable exception to this rule namely, in regard to the custom of shaving the head, which was a Tartar custom, and which it was considered necessary, it seems, for political reasons, to enforce upon the conquered in the very beginning of the present Tartar dynasty.

In general, China's neighbours set out, in fact, to annex China, and it ended in their being themselves annexed, and to a great degree absorbed.

There are, it seems to me, three principal systems of civilization: the Western—i.e., the European—the Indian, and the Chinese. From the scholastic point of view, the Egyptian civilization should be counted as a fourth; but it

was so remote and unique in character, and came to an end at comparatively so early an age in the world's history, that I need not concern myself with it in discussing my present theme.

Western civilization may, it appears to me, be regarded as a development of the Greek civilization, tempered by Semitic religious notions. With regard to this last system of civilization, scholars are prone to trace its descent from something much further back—some will even discern a direct derivation from India—but it is a matter involving too much detail for consideration here, and there is no necessity for me to enter upon it. And this Western system of civilization progressed almost entirely westward, until a new start was made towards the east within only very recent times.

We may therefore say that there were only two systems of civilization in the whole of Asia—that is to say, the Indian civilization in India and the Chinese civilization in the Far East. Indian civilization made no expansion towards the Far East beyond its own boundary, except in respect of Buddhism. civilization was paramount in that part of Asia which faced the Pacific Ocean. It was therefore natural that all the tribes and peoples dwelling round the centre of that Chinese civilization should have bowed to China as their elder sister, and ultimately have been fused into one nation with her. Even in the outer regions, where small States rose and fell from time to time, it was to have been expected that there should also be found a readiness to pay her much respect as the mistress of that civilization, much in the same way that different European States for many centuries reverenced Rome, Even Japan cannot claim to have been any exception to the rule, for she likewise was in the habit, in ancient times, of setting high store on Chinese civilization. There was, however, one marked difference which existed between Japan and the other smaller States bordering China on the Asiatic Continent: Japan did not scruple to avail herself of the opportunity of introducing Chinese civilization, but she

always endeavoured to maintain her own individuality, partly because her people always were possessed of distinctive characteristics, and partly, perhaps, because she was able, from her insular position, to escape actual contact with Chinese political ascendancy. We read in an ancient chronicle that when a letter not altogether courteous was sent to the Emperor of Japan by the Emperor of China, the Emperor of Japan wrote an answer commencing with these words: 'The Emperor of the land where the sun rises addresses hinself to the Emperor of the land where the sun sets.'

It is recorded in a Chinese history that in the reign of the great second Emperor of T'ang an envoy was sent to Japan, where some dispute arose concerning matters of ceremony between him and the Court of Japan, as the consequence of which the envoy was obliged to return to China without delivering the Imperial message he had been commissioned to deliver. This appears to be due to the fact that the Chinese envoy wanted to act as though he was a messenger from a superior power to a subordinate State—a thing which Japan would never have consented to. We have a phrase which is very common—'the Chinese intelligence and the Japanese soul.' This phrase is attributed to Sugawara Michizane, a great scholar and statesman of the tenth century, who is deified. When he was ordered by the Emperor to go to China, he begged to be excused on the ground that it was not becoming in Japan to be too slavish to China by imitating her in everything. He maintained that the intelligence which was obtainable by studying Chinese was important and beneficial, but it was also necessary to keep the old soul of Japan intact. During the Tang dynasty of China-that is to say, in the reign of Hsuan-tsung-the envoys of Japan, of Tufan (Tibet), of Shinlo (the then most important of the Korean kingdoms), and of the Tajiks (Persian), happened to arrive in the capital almost simultaneously. There were also numerous other envoys and their suites, from different foreign lands, present at the time. On the occasion of a formal audience, which was then given for the purpose of

receiving congratulations for the New Year, the first and second seats to the right of the throne were allotted to the envoys of Tufan and Japan respectively, and the first and second seats to the left to the other two envoys. To this arrangement the Japanese envoy objected, and it was at once modified, the first and second to the right being allotted to Tufan and Shinlo respectively, and the first and second to the left to Japan and the Tajiks respectively (the left from the centre is regarded by the Japanese as higher than the right, because it is the right when faced from the front). And again, when the Mongolian Emperor sent his envoys inviting Japan to submit to him, and persisted in seeking to obtain a definite answer from Japan, the Japanese statesman—barbarous as the act may appear —who was responsible for the negotiation, becoming impatient with the repeated insolence of the envoys, ordered them to be beheaded. We also see it recorded in history of an earlier date that when Japan used to send envoys and students to China, the composure and dignity of those envoys were objects of admiration to the Chinese Court, so much so that Japan came to be called by them 'Kuntsukuo' (the country of gentlemen). All these incidents will show, in outline, what sort of position Japan always occupied with regard to China.

A close examination of the nature and characteristics and growth of Chinese civilization shows that it achieved vast expansion; but long before even the advent of Western civilization in the East the limits of that expansion had been reached. On the North the Mongolian regious were incorporated with, or rather annexed to, the Chinese Empire; but the influence of Chinese civilization beyond the Great Wall was always very feeble. It may be said that its limit was practically marked by the Great Wall. Towards Central Asia also it was very weak. And, moreover, the natives of Mongolia, Manchuria, and Central Asia are no longer those of ancient times. They have not a spark of the fire and energy of the time gone by left in them. On the contrary, they are perpetually hampered by the superstitious influences which have grown up with, and

are nurtured by, Lamaism. If there are any Mongolians or Tartars who are still to be feared, they are those who now belong to the Russian community—a fact so often overlooked by the ordinary public.

I have already alluded to the introduction of Lamaism into these regions by the Mongolians of a former period. It appears that at the time of Genghiskhan some steps had already been taken. Kublaikhan, at a later date, made a great priest of Tibet his teacher. That priest invented for him the Mongolian alphabet, founded upon Indian letters, and by its aid a large number of the Buddhist Sûtras were translated by Kublai's order into the Mongolian language by that priest and several of his compatriots and coadjutors. The work, which was a tremendous undertaking, was accomplished in the succeeding reign. When the Tartar dynasty was established in China, it also favoured Lamaism, and the course taken with reference thereto by the Mongolian dynasty was adopted by it also. Venerable priests were sent for from Tibet; Manchurian alphabets were elaborated on the basis of Indian characters, and the translation of a huge number of the Buddhist sacred books was forthwith resolved upon. Besides all this, the Lama priests were, under both dynasties, the favoured recipients of much patronage and distinction. From all this one can easily imagine what an immense influence Lamaism exerted in those regions. I can say with certainty the influence thus exercised sufficed to govern the mental faculties of the natives of those regions in a way that even Chinese civilization had never been able to do. Thus, on the one hand. while the modern Mongols and Manchus do not retain the old dash and spirit that distinguished them in former times, on the other, they have not been able to attain to the full height of Chinese civilization, the result being their thorough degeneration.

In Manchuria the original Tartars that still remain are only a minority of the inhabitants, the rest being chiefly immigrants from Shantung. A large proportion of the original Tartars have in one way or other penetrated into China Proper, and have there become sinicized, so that

the present Manchuria is no longer the Manchuria of former days; even the Tartar language itself is said to be almost disappearing. One might have expected the Chinese, who have taken up their abode in Manchuria, to inherit some of the better qualities of the original Tartar inhabitants, but it is not the case. Some people say that they do not even come up to the standard of their compatriots of other parts of the Chinese Empire. In a word, I can say that there is now little or no probability of any powerful people arising from those regions of Mongolia and Manchuria, as was the case centuries ago.

Towards Tibet the influence of Chinese civilization is blocked by the Tibetan State, where Indian influence under somewhat transformed conditions is crystallized and paramount, and that influence is stronger than that of If we look a little further south, it is blocked by the Himalayas, and, still further south, in the Malay Peninsula, it is held in check by Siam and Annam, not to say Burma, in all of which the Indian elements preponderate over those of China. Even Tonking has never been truly sinicized. Then, as to the internal condition of China, civilization arrived at a state of complete stagnation many centuries since. No statesman dares to embark on innovations, for if he were to do so his fall would be assured. Take, for example, the case of Wang-An-Shi, of the Sung dynasty. Great as he was as a statesman and scholar, he totally failed when he attempted a radical change in the administrative and economical system, and his character is always painted in the blackest colour in consequence, not of his failure, but of his attempt. Moreover, the Empire is big enough; the Chinese have no desire, nor do they perceive any necessity to extend it further. It has never entered their minds to create any colonial possessions outside their own Empire. Such things have ever been totally at variance with their ideas. Chinese, especially the southern ones, are as a rule sagacious in commerce, and large numbers of them have gone abroad in recent years. This is due mainly to the fact that they have had little field for enterprise at home

in political and kindred matters, so that they have come to exert their faculty for pecuniary gain. Hence those who go abroad do so only for personal and material advantages, and have no political significance.

The highest ideal entertained by the Chinese of the best kind of government has always been Jen-Cheng, which may be translated as 'merciful and humane administration.' Theoretically, the Emperor is an autocrat, but when he becomes excessively oppressive and tyrannical the population rises against him to put an end to his dynasty, setting up a new one in its place. This has become a recognised principle, and has been morally justified through thousands of years. The natural consequence of it has been to cause individual subjects to contribute their private means as little as possible to the State; hence they have the greatest abhorrence of heavy taxes, for whatsoever causes they may be levied, and in China there is actually almost no system of taxation as a national institution, though all sorts of devices are used by the provincial officials to raise certain sums for contribution to the Central Government as required by them. Hence the Central Government has very little means to undertake any enterprising works on a grand scale. This is also one of several causes why the thought never occurs to the Chinese to organize any colonial possessions. True it is that several grand public works, such as the construction of the Great Wall and of canals, were undertaken by energetic rulers, but they were done chiefly by forced contribution of labour, and were generally unpopular, so much so, indeed, that the verdict of Chinese history is generally rather unfavourable than favourable to those rulers who conceived and accomplished costly works of avowedly public utility.

The mass of the Chinese are not patriotic in a political sense, and in any given part of the Empire but little concern is felt about the calamities that may befall other parts of the Empire, even in the shape of armed aggression from outside. Their common interests are few, and the immense distances militate against solidarity of feeling. Moreover, China has always regarded herself as placed above all surrounding countries, and her notions of mankind, as interpreted by her own traditions and ancient teachings, have prevented her people from entertaining any feeling of healthy rivalry with outsiders. Her feeling with regard to dwellers beyond her borders was that it was better to placate them by conciliatory methods than to combat them by sheer force. This has been China's cosmopolitan policy, always kept in view by her rulers and expounded by her moralists.

There is a Chinese phrase to this effect: 'No two suns in the heavens, and no two Emperors on the earth.' This simply means, however, that there ought not to be two supreme rulers in China. The Chinese mind never took into account the possibility of there being any rulers in other and remote regions of the world. Hence in China, although the country was split up into several States from time to time through the weakening of the reigning dynasty and the rising of new leaders in different parts of the Empire, such conditions as these were always considered to be merely temporary and quite abnormal. People always expected that order would be restored sooner or later under the régime of one Emperor. This being so, even a foreign dynasty, when it had once conquered the Empire, was the real and true master of the country, to whom the allegiance of the whole Empire was due. Here, again, we may perceive that there can exist in China no pure and simple patriotism. It is, however, to be borne in mind that the brotherhood or common interests of the Chinese population, loose and lukewarm as these ties perhaps are, are nevertheless so wide and in a measure so deep that it is difficult to separate altogether the different parts from one another—I mean to such an extent as obtains in Europe, where so many different and independent States coexist side by side.

The Chinese are a nation, despite all their faults. I might compare the Chinese nation with a mass of raw cotton. It is not solid, but its different particles have their mutual cohesive power, and form a more or less compact substance. It can exert no damaging force against any

other substance, from the very nature of its yielding disposition, yet it is best to leave it compact as it is, because it is more useful in that form, and, figuratively speaking, it will rest quite satisfied and content if left to itself in that way.

The limitation of Chinese expansion has become more marked since the advent of Western civilization in the Far East. China is surrounded by this new force on all sides, and her attitude is constantly one of defence. A little time ago I read in an American review an article written by a Chinese diplomatist. He made a remark somewhat in the following words:

'Our motto is, "Do not do unto others what you would not have others do unto you," but your motto is, "Do unto others as you would have others do unto you"; in other words, we are negative, but you are positive. In consequence of this your people often force other people to do what you yourself like without inquiring whether those other people want it to be done or not. It therefore often results in your doing things against the wish of other people, and often with mischievous results.'

This seems to be about the correct description of the feeling of the Chinese as against the rest of the world. China has her moral notions, which are by no means lacking in refinement. It is well for outsiders not to despise the Chinese too much, or, rather, it is desirable that they should be treated with proper consideration. If they are so treated they will always prove themselves to be a good nation with which to maintain peaceable and beneficial intercourse.

Of late there has been much talk about the Yellow Peril, or the possibility of a Pan-Asiatic combination; this appears to me, as I have said so often elsewhere, nothing more than a senseless and mischievous agitation. How can China rise up alone, and become a source of peril in this form to the rest of mankind? From what I have said in this paper it will be plainly seen that it is a matter of the greatest improbability. It is therefore in this respect all the more desirable that the mass of Chinese cotton be left

alone. We have a proverb saying, 'Even a small insect has a soul,' and another saying, 'A rat in despair might bite a cat.' These proverbs mean that too much persecution should not be inflicted even upon weak objects. Therefore I can say that even such peaceful people as the Chinese should not be treated without due consideration for their feelings.

As I have shown already, China has not been and is not of her own seeking an aggressive nation. It is not only so with the ruling classes—in other words, with those who conquered China and became sinicized—but with the nation itself at large, which has been imbued with the same spirit and the same ideas throughout all time, so that they have become its distinguishing and permanent attributes. The very basic principle of Chinese civilization is essentially pacific.

Looking back through the whole course of history, the Chinese rulers who despatched well-organized counter-expeditions into the lands of the enemy were, as a rule, able and renowned Emperors, such as the first and fifth Emperors of the Han dynasty, the second Emperor of the Tang dynasty, and the first and second Emperors of the Suidynasty; but nevertheless they almost invariably failed in their enterprise, often suffering very serious defeats.

Hence distant expeditions came to be universally regarded by the Chinese as a curse to the Empire. There is in Chinese a well-known phrase, which might be translated as the 'degradation or disgrace of militarism.' That phrase consists of only two words in Chinese, and represents the stigma which all rulers have for several tens of centuries been most afraid of incurring, as well as the warning which councillors of the Empire came most commonly to employ in advising their masters. Even when an expedition against Korea was mooted by the great second Emperor of T'ang, at the zenith of his splendid career, the voices of his councillors were one and all against it.

In literature, also, almost all the sentiments which have survived about China's warfare with barbarians in the form of poetry merely echo the misery and hardships entailed, and but seldom is there any glorification of war. The examples of the expeditions of earlier rulers are not to be esteemed subjects of emulation for later Sovereigns. And yet if they are steadily driven into the position of a chased rat, it is not possible to guarantee that even these men of peace may not in the end betray some sort of resentment. I may, for instance, be allowed to say here that Europeans cannot be regarded as entirely free from responsibility for the trouble which culminated in the Boxer rising some years ago.

Then, again, there are some who accuse Japan as the probable organizer of the Pan-Asiatic Peril. Peace-loving as the Japanese also are, the characteristics, notions, and feelings of the Japanese and Chinese are so different that there is no possibility of their complete amalgamation in one common cause; and what is true with regard to the Chinese holds even more true with regard to other Asiatic peoples.

Japan aspires, moreover, to elevate herself to the same plane and to press onward in the same path of civilization as the countries of the West. Even in everyday matters one likes to choose good company, so as not to estrange his best friends. Can anyone imagine that Japan would like to organize a Pan-Asiatic agitation of her own seeking, in which she must take so many different peoples of Asia into her confidence and company—people with whom she has no joint interests or any community of thought and feeling? And what of the risks Japan would wantonly incur were she to dare to attempt such an enterprise in the face of the most powerful nations of the earth? Furthermore, the conditions of existence throughout the whole world are totally changed from the time when Genghis Khan or Timur (Tamerlane) carried out their extraordinary exploits.

Let us view the matter from another standpoint, and I trust I shall be excused if I allow myself to be extremely candid. In Europe and on its borders there are many States, some of them well advanced, some rather backward. Would it be practicable for all these States to form themselves into one compact body in organized offensive com-

bination against an outside Power, say America? I venture to assert that, even with the intelligence and ability of the advanced nations of Europe, such a union of interests and strength would be quite impossible. How, then, could it be expected for one moment that the various peoples of the East, with their varying degrees of intelligence, their conflicting interests, and their old-standing feuds and jealousies, could ever have cohesion enough to range themselves under one banner against the powers of the Occident? And if they could do so, is it to be imagined that Japan would enter upon so quixotic an enterprise as to place herself at the head of so unmanageable a mob? At the very first onset of a Western military force, the untrained masses would take to flight, and Japan would find herself alone, to bear the consequences of her folly. In Japan we have profited by our military studies to the extent that we comprehend the value of a thoroughly homogeneous force. Could any conceivable agglomeration of Asiatic troops be termed a homogeneous body, and could such an agglomeration be made, by any means known to man, into a compact force fit to associate with a highly-trained and thoroughly experienced army such as Japan now possesses, even were she prepared to sacrifice everything for the very dubious privilege of placing herself at their head? Turn we for an instant to India. There we have an example of a vast population immeasurably more numerous than the white element which rules it, yet split up into so many States and sects and castes that combination always has been and must be completely out of the question. Has anyone seriously supposed that England has to fear a peril there, such as might be conceivable were union among the many divided peoples at all possible? What is the history of the one attempt to overthrow British rule? That of its utter failure owing to lack of combined effort; of a mutiny of a comparatively small number of troops checked by the fidelity of other regiments who refused to assist in the rising, owing to personal and tribal difference and caste prejudices. Is it not notorious that these Indian races have not only no cohesion but downright antagonism, notwithstanding that they are alike subjects of a conquering nation? Is there any likelihood of these Indian natives and other Asiatic peoples being organized into a compact and united force, as some mischievous writers suggest? If this argument can fairly be applied as regards organization into an effective fighting force of the Asiatic peoples, how much stronger does it become when the matter is considered in a political sense! The peoples of the East are, some of them, politically independent; others are under the sway of one or other European Power. To combine them in a single undertaking would be a task utterly impracticable and unpromising. Japan has already cast in her lot with the Occident, and in the eyes of many Asiatics it is to be remembered the Japanese are no less 'Yang-Kwai' (foreign devils) than the Occidentals.

In addition, and with the same candour as before, let me say that Japan has herself chiefly to consider. she does not for one instant wish it to be thought that she looks down with contempt upon other Oriental nations which she does not—they, for reasons of their own, have not chosen to accompany her along the path of progress, and actually regard her as something of an apostate. Can she, by any stretch of the imagination, be suspected of a willingness to permit her own future to be jeopardized by pausing in her own advance in order to join them in what she fully realizes could only be an enterprise foredoomed to disastrous failure? Moreover, no Occidentals need imagine that Japan would particularly welcome the creation of a strong power on the Continent of Asia in close proximity to her own shores. To me it seems that the charge of organizing a Pan-Asiatic League which is now and then brought against Japan, if taken seriously, would only be to subject her to utterly unjust persecution, quite unworthy of the civilized nations of the world. It would be like turning round upon an apt pupil whom one had one's self trained and encouraged and brought to the world's notice—rather against its own original inclinations and wishes—and that on the mere ground that the pupil belonged to a different set from one's own, and had grown a trifle more quickly and more robust than one had expected when one first took him by the hand and led him forth into new paths.

Japan took up the cudgels in the present war with Russia, as I have elsewhere shown, and as it is by this time, I hope, perfectly understood, with no other motive than the defence of her own interests. Whenever it may come to a conclusion she will, as heretofore, seek to establish peace on a sure and sound foundation, having no objects in view that are not consistent with a pacific policy. She has sought throughout, and will continue to seek in the future, the benefits which accrue from this line of action, and it is in pursuance of these principles that she has endeavoured to associate herself with the aims and objects of Western nations. Her people cannot, if they would, change the tint of their skins, and if, after all her efforts, she is to be ostracized merely on the score of colour, she will be obliged to regard it as harsh treatment, far exceeding anything that she had a right to expect from the chivalry and enlightenment of the nations of the Occident. At all events. I cannot imagine what material advantage those Occidental Powers who profess to be friendly with Japan can achieve by driving her to desperation with those ungenerous and, let me say, unmanly accusations. When this war ends, we shall devote ourselves to the arts of peace, and I may add that we can hardly expect that, no matter in what form the present contest may terminate, circumstances will permit of our embarking upon hostilities in other directions. I can positively declare, in the name of Japan, that when this struggle reaches its conclusion she will honestly and faithfully pursue a policy of peace.

DISCUSSION

SIR WEST RIDGEWAY: I think that the general reluctance to speak arises from the fact that we all agree with everything in this most instructive paper. There is no point on which to join issue in a discussion. Not only do we all highly appreciate the highly instructive and interesting paper which the Baron has read, but we feel intense sympathy with the latter part of it, in which he exposed that absurd bugbear and bogey, the Yellow Peril.

SIR ROBERT DOUGLAS: Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen,—I have very little to say, except to express my great interest in the paper we have just heard. I may, however, emphasize one point. The Baron urges that China is eminently a pacific nation, that all her tendencies, all her aggressions even, are peaceful. He has thus, I am glad to say, struck another nail into the coffin of that dead bogey, the Yellow Peril.

SIR THOMAS HOLDICH: As the discussion seems to have come to an abrupt conclusion, I may venture to say a few words. The subject is one of the greatest interest, and, coming from such an authority as we have had the pleasure of welcoming here this afternoon, the views advocated must strike us as conclusive.

If there is any point which it is possible to criticise, it would be the question of the fighting qualities of the Chinese. The Baron does not think much of their military prowess. No symptom at present shows itself of the scientific application of China's enormous latent capabilities to military purposes; but if we look further into her historical expansion, we shall find that China has given evidence of considerable vitality in this direction. One instance I may mention. Towards the end of the eighteenth century, after Warren Hastings had done his best to establish friendly relations between Tibet and India, the Gurkhas of Nepal broke loose and raided Tibet, pillaging Shigatse, and dispersing the priestly authorities. appealed to China. China responded with alacrity. General San Foo led 70,000 men through the gorges of Western China to the Tibetan highlands, crossing at least half a dozen passes as high as Mont Blane ere he reached the plateau. He had then to cover 400 miles of the terrible Tibetan plateau-land before he came upon the Gurkhas. We regard the Gurkhas as the best fighting material in India, and they were a strong military people even at that time.

When the Chinese General found his foes, he first inflicted upon them a severe defeat in the open; then, forcing them back to Nepal, he followed them up till he had them in front of their capital city, Khatmandu. The river, their homes, and their women were behind them. The Chinese forces, which had just covered an enormous distance in the face of gigantic natural obstacles, did not like the look of things; they hesitated in the attack. It is on such an occasion that a great General shows his capacity. San Foo was a great General. He turned his guns on to the rear of his own army, forced Gurkhas and his own soldiers all together into the river, inflicted a severe defeat upon the enemy, and took heavy reprisals from Khatmandu. To this day Nepal sends a mission through Lhasa to China in recognition of Chinese suzerainty.

I do not think that China, as a consolidated nation, is ever likely to be aggressive; but we must remember what the Chinaman can do if he tries. Two of our best soldiers, General Gordon and Colonel Bower, who went to Wei-hai-wei to raise a Chinese regiment, declare that the Chinaman has in him the makings of a good soldier. As the strength of China was referred to somewhat lightly, I think I am justified in recalling the manner in which China, in past history, has signalized herself in military feats.

I ask you to allow me, in your name, to convey sincere thanks to the Baron for his most interesting and able paper, and to Mr. Chirol for the way in which he has read it.


Baron Suyematsu: I thank you very much: First, for the manner in which you have received my paper; second, for the vote of thanks; and, third, I wish to especially thank Mr. Chirol for the admirable manner in which he has read the paper.


I should like to add just a few words regarding the Chairman's remarks. I quite agree that, in some ways and under certain conditions, the Chinese may make good soldiers. The whole intent of my paper was to show that China was not aggressive if left alone. China will not pick a quarrel with outsiders—she is not a military nation. Militarism is looked down upon. To be a soldier is the worst kind of profession. She has fine and high ideas of enlightenment, very different from those of Western civilization, but, one must own, most refined. Militarism is not China's idea of refinement.

What I said was that even a chased rat might turn and bite a cat. I did not like to say too much, but I hope you understood what I meant. If I had meant to show that China was very weak and could do nothing, she would have been exterminated many centuries ago. That she has kept her corporate existence until now proves that she can do something. I wished to impress upon the

Occident that she may, by easy means, make good friends with China; but Westerners do not employ those easy means—quite otherwise. You very often make yourselves into a cat chasing a rat; and the rat may bite. That is what I ask you not to do. I beg once more to thank you for the most kind manner in which you have received me and the views that I have been able to lay before you.







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